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NOTE
UPHOLDING RACIAL DIVERSITY IN
THE CLASSROOM AS A COMPELLING
INTERESTt
"People do not learn very much when they are
surroundedonly
1
by the likes of themselves."
INTRODUCTION

The recognition that diversity plays an essential role in the development and education of a child is not a novel idea. While years
of Supreme Court jurisprudence firmly entrenched segregation in
education, 2 educators fought for diversity in the classroom. 3 In fact,
studies showing the adverse effects of segregation on the education of
African-American students played a large role in the eventual overthrow of segregation in Brown v. Board of Education.4 In recent
years, the argument for diversity in education has gained even more
strength and support as school districts seek to improve the overall
quality of education, particularly in areas where de facto segregation

t Awarded the sixth annual Case Western Reserve Law Review Outstanding Student
Note Award, as selected by the Volume 51 Editorial Board.
1 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 313 n.48 (1978) (quoting the
President of Princeton University).
2 See, e.g., Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899) (falling to strike down a Georgia law requiring blacks and whites to be educated separately); Gong
Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 85-86 (1927) ("Were [separate but equal] a new question, it would
call for very full argument and consideration, but we think that it is the same question which has
been many times decided to be within the constitutional power of the state legislature ...").
3 See Thomas L Emerson et al., Segregation and the Equal ProtectionClause: Brieffor
the Committee ofLaw Teachers againstSegregation in Legal Education, 34 MiNN. L. REV. 289
(1950).
4 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Footnote eleven in Brown specifically cited the work of several
renowned researchers who, as a result of their studies, concluded that segregation harmed African-American students educationally and socially.
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exists.5 Those who fight for diverse classrooms recognize that when
students from a variety of backgrounds are brought together, it is not
only those of the minority class who benefit. Rather, all students can
6
learn from being surrounded by those who are different from them.
In the courts, however, the quest for racial diversity has received
mixed treatment. This has left both courts and school districts wondering how best to attain racial diversity in the classroom without violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.7
The Supreme Court has yet to specify what interests it will consider
sufficiently compelling to allow consideration of race in the admissions policy of an educational institution or school district. As a result of the Supreme Court's silence, several circuit courts have
reached markedly different results when confronted with challenges
to school admission programs that use race as a factor. 8 This lack of
conformity confounds and inhibits school districts when they attempt
to promote diversity within their school systems. Despite this confusion, the Supreme Court has passed 9up several opportunities to resolve the "diversity interest" question.
This Note urges the Supreme Court to end the uncertainty by
firmly pronouncing that achieving diversity in the classroom is a sufficiently compelling interest to satisfy strict scrutiny, allowing narrowly tailored admissions programs to consider racial diversity in
their decisions. Part I looks at recent Supreme Court decisions considering affirmative action programs in education and the economic
sector. Part II analyzes the legal arguments used by the various cir5 De facto segregation is segregation resulting from "factors, such as residential housing
patterns, which are beyond the control of state officials." NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559
F.2d 1042, 1045 (6th Cir. 1977). Unlike de jure segregation, it is not the result of a deliberate
attempt to separate people of different races. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1971) (de facto segregation is present "where racial imbalance exists
in the schools but with no showing that this was brought about by discriminatory action of state
authorities").
6 It is essential to point out that many facets of diversity exist, including ethnic origin,
religion, socio-economic status, and the many other traits that contribute to each person's individuality. This Note deals only with race because it alone triggers strict scrutiny review in the
courts.
7 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1: "No state shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
8 Compare Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the University of Texas School of Law may not use race as a factor in law school admission), with
Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 752 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that "a
compelling interest can be found in a program that has as its object the reduction of racial isolation and what appears to be de facto segregation"), and Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of the
Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 121 S. Ct. 186 (2000) (upholding the constitutionality of an elementary school's use of race/ethnicity in its admission process).
9 The Supreme Court has not heard an affirmative action case dealing with education
since it first addressed the issue in Bakke.
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cuit courts to either reject or uphold diversity as a compelling interest
in education. Part III points out that a vast amount of educational research supports the conclusion that diversity in education is a compelling interest. Furthermore, Part III goes on to contend that the Supreme Court's decisions in Regents of the University of Californiav.
Bakkel0 and subsequent cases provide a sound legal basis on which to
rest such a decision. Finally, Part IV discusses several factors that a
school district should consider in narrowly tailoring an admissions
program to cultivate a racially diverse school system.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIvE ACTION IN THE SUPREME
COURT

A. Justice Powell's Opinion in Bakke
The Supreme Court's treatment of affirmative action programs
over the last twenty-two years has been nothing short of fickle. Characterized by sharply divided courts, plurality opinions, and seemingly
contradictory holdings," the Court's jurisprudence in this area has
perplexed and provoked commentators and courts alike. Perhaps no
case is as indicative of this lack
of uniformity as Regents of the Uni2
Bakke.1
v.
California
of
versity
In Bakke, the plaintiff challenged the admissions policy of the
University of California, Davis Medical School after twice applying
for and being denied admission. 13 At the time of Alan Bakke's application, Davis utilized an admissions system that set aside 16 of the
100 possible openings in each class for members of specified minority groups, including: African Americans, Chicanos, Asians, and
American Indians. 14 The minimum qualifications required for entrance to one of the 16 "minority" slots were less stringent than those
required for white students.15 Hence, the Davis admissions committee passed over Bakke, a white male possessing above-average academic credentials, in favor of arguably less qualified minority students.16 Bakke then sued, claiming that that he had been denied equal
'0 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
" See AuGusrus J. JONES, AFFIRMATIVE TALK, AFFIRMATIVE AcroN, at xi-xii (1991).

Of the first eleven affirmative action decisions handed down by the Supreme Court, six of them
upheld a gender or race based set-aside program by a 5-4 margin. In the remaining five, the
Court struck down affirmative action programs by no more than a 6-3 margin. Id. at xii.
12 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
13 Id. at 275.

14 Id. at 274-75.
15 For example, minority students under consideration for one of the sixteen "set-aside"

seats did not have to adhere to the minimum 2.5 GPA requirement for general admission to the
school. Id. at 275.
16 Id.
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protection under the Constitution and that the set-aside program violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.17
It took six separate opinions from a deeply fractured Supreme
Court to determine that the Davis program was unlawful. Four justices, led by Justice Stevens, declined to reach the equal protection
issue. is Instead, they would have struck down the Davis program as a
violation of Title VI's "broad prohibition against the exclusion of any
individual" because of that individual's race. 19 A different group of
four, led by Justice Brennan, would have upheld the program on equal
protection grounds. 20 They thought that the Court should apply intermediate scrutiny to "benign" racial preferences. 21 According to
Brennan, strict scrutiny should not apply to whites as a class because
they had never been subjected to "'a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness. ' '22 Under this intermediate standard of review, Brennan concluded that the Davis program did not violate the Constitution.23
Justice Powell, in an opinion joined in separate parts by each
group of four justices, struck down the Davis program as unconstitutional while holding that, under the right circumstances, race could be
appropriately considered in admissions. 24 He started his analysis by
stating that, because of the potential for abuse inherent in any distinction based on race, strict scrutiny applies regardless of whom the distinction is designed to benefit?2 This forced Davis to show a compelling interest behind the program. Davis suggested four justifications,
including "the attainment of a diverse student body." 2 6 Powell wrote
that attaining diversity "clearly is a constitutionally permissible
17 Title VI provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."

42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
's
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 413 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist joined Justice Stevens in his opinion.
19 Id.

2
21

Id. at 361.
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justices Marshall, White,

and Blackmun joined Justice Brennan in his opinion.
2
Id. at 357 (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
23 Id. at 379.
2A Id. at 320.
25 Id. at 291 ("Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus

call for the most exacting judicial examination.").
26 Id. at 311. The other justifications Davis offered for the program were "reducing the
historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the medical profession," "countering the effects of societal discrimination," and "increasing the number of
physicians who will practice in communities currently underserved." Id. at 306. Of these latter
three, Powell held that only the interest in remedying past discrimination could be compelling,
but that Davis could not invoke this interest because the school could not show specific findings
of past discrimination. Id. at 307-11.
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goal." 27 He based his reasoning on both the recognition that academic
freedom is a "special concern" of the First Amendment,2 8 and the
strength of several statements and policies submitted by prestigious
universities in favor of diversity.2 9 Powell concluded by holding that
the Davis program failed to survive strict scrutiny because it was not
narrowly tailored to its goal of attaining diversity. 30 Specifically,
Powell contrasted the Davis admissions program to that of Harvard
University, which considered race as a "plus" in a particular applicant's file, rather than setting aside seats exclusively for those of a
certain race.3 '
Bakke remains the only Supreme Court case addressing whether
attaining diversity in education can be a compelling interest. As a
result, public schools and universities have relied upon Powell's recognition that an interest in diversity can be compelling to justify
consideration of race in admissions.
B. The Supreme Court'sAffirmative Action OpinionsAfter Bakke
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,32 the Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of a collective bargaining agreement
which provided that minority teachers in the Jackson, Michigan
school district would not be laid off in greater proportion than their
existing percentage in the school system. As in Bakke, the Court in
Wygant issued several opinions, making the holding somewhat difficult to interpret.
Justice Powell, writing again for a plurality, struck down the
school board's articulated interest in providing "role models" for minority students.3 3 This interest, according to Powell, could not prevail
because the Jackson school board based it on societal discrimination
rather than specific findings of past discrimination by the school
board. 34 He also noted that less restrictive means could be employed
to retain minority teachers; therefore, the agreement failed the "nar" Id. at 311-12.
28 Id. at 312 ("The freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education
includes the selection of its student body.").
29 Id. at 312, 316. Powell quoted extensively from statements made by the President of
Princeton University emphasizing the importance of diversity in creating a learning atmosphere.
Additionally, he pointed to a brief submitted as amici curiae by Columbia University, Harvard
University, Stanford University, and the University of Pennsylvania, which argued similarly.
" Id. at 315. In fact, Powell wrote that the Davis program "would hinder rather than
further attainment of genuine diversity" by focusing solely on racial diversity at the expense of
"a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a
single though important element." Id.
"tId. at 317.
32 476 U.S.267 (1986).
33 Id. at 275-76.
4 id.
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rowly tailored" requirement as well. 35 Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, warned not to confuse the goal of "providing good 'role
models' ... with the very different goal of promoting racial diversity
among the faculty. 36
Powell's contention that benign racial preference programs
should be subjected to strict scrutiny finally prevailed in City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 37 In Croson, a Richmond, Virginia,
building contractor sought to invalidate a local set-aside program.
The program in dispute required contractors securing construction
contracts from the city to subcontract at least thirty percent of the dollar amount of each contract to minority-owned businesses. 3 8 Justice
O'Connor, writing for a plurality, confirmed what the Court had intimated in Wygant, that asserting an interest in remedying general, societal discrimination would not survive strict scrutiny. 39 Therefore,
the Richmond set-aside requirement failed because the city could not
show specific findings of discrimination in the Richmond construction industry. 4°
In contrast, the Court upheld a program designed to promote diversity in broadcasting and radio programming in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission.4 1 In a 5-4 decision, Justice Brennan, relying on Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke,
held that the FCC had a substantial interest in encouraging diversity
in broadcasting. 42 Brennan recognized that all members of the listening audience would gain from increased broadcast diversity, as Powell recognized that diversity in education benefited all students. 43 Notably, Brennan applied only intermediate scrutiny to the FCC pro44
gram, deferring to the congressional authorization of the program.
Justice O'Connor dissented, arguing that the potential for abuse inherent in racial classifications required strict scrutiny review.45 She
35 Id. at 273-74.
36

Id. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

37 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
38 id.
39 Id. at 499.
40 Id. at 505.
41 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200

(1995). The program gave preference to racial minorities in two ways: by giving minorities an
advantage in comparative licensing proceedings and by allowing licensees struggling to keep
their licenses to sell to minority-owned businesses at distress sale prices. See id. at 556-558.
42 Id. at 569.
43 See id. at 579-83.
44 Id. In applying intermediate scrutiny, Brennan relied on the holding in Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980). In Fullilove, the Court appeared to defer to Congress by applying only an intermediate form of scrutiny to a congressional set-aside program similar to that in
Croson. Id. at 473, 490.
41 Metro Broad., 497 U.S. at 602 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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also argued that only an interest in remedying past racial discrimination could ever be compelling. 46
Justice O'Connor's argument that strict scrutiny should apply to
all racial classifications, whether state or federal, won out in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.47 Overruling Metro Broadcasting, the
Adarand Court ordered that strict scrutiny be applied to a federallyfunded construction program that granted preference in subcontracting to firms owned by "socially and economically disadvantaged individuals." 48 Despite this holding, O'Connor cautioned that strict
scrutiny should not be "'strict in theory, but fatal in fact,"' and noted
that racial classifications could still be sustained under the right circumstances.4 9 Justice Stevens, in dissent, pointed out that, although
the Court overturned Metro Broadcasting'suse of intermediate scrutiny, Adarand did not disturb the holding that diversity could be a
compelling interest.50

II. THE CIRcuIT COURTS' TREATMENT OF THE DIVERSITY INTEREST
Confronted with this tangled web of Supreme Court precedent,
the circuit courts have struggled to address whether an interest in diversity in secondary education is compelling. While many courts
have chosen to await Supreme Court guidance, 51 others have expressed opinions either supporting or striking down the diversity interest. Of those choosing to rule on the enduring vitality of the diversity justification, only one circuit has conclusively pronounced it
dead, holding that no non-remedial interest could justify consideration
of race.52 In contrast, a number of courts have upheld racial preference programs on the strength of asserted interests other than remedying past specific discrimination.53

4' Id. at 612.

47 515 U.S 200 (1995).

48 Id. at 224. Members of specified minority groups were automatically considered to fall

within this category under the program. Id. at 205.
41 Id. dt 237 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519

(1980)).
50 Id. at 258 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51 See, e.g., Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 796 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting the Supreme
Court's silence and assuming-without deciding-that diversity can be compelling).
52 See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
53 See Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000); Hunter ex
rel Brandt v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 121 S.

Ct. 186 (2000).
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A. Rejecting the Diversity Interest
In Hopwood v. Texas, 54 four white applicants to the University
of Texas School of Law challenged the school's use of separate admissions standards and policies for minority and non-minority students. At the time, the admissions program divided applicants into
two categories: non-minority applicants, and black and MexicanAmerican applicants. 55 It ranked the students by establishing an index score based on a combination of their GPA and LSAT scores and
then placing them in one of three categories based on their score:
"presumptive admit," "presumptive deny," and a "discretionary
zone.' 56 Separate admissions criteria, waiting lists, and reviewing
subcommittees were used for each category of applicant. 57 As a result
of the separate standards, the school denied admission to the four
plaintiffs but admitted black and Mexican-American students with
lower GPA and LSAT scores.58
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, after extensively reviewing Bakke and several other Supreme Court affirmative action
cases, declared that Justice Powell's approval of the diversity justification was not binding precedent. 59 They arrived at this conclusion
by arguing that, to the extent that Powell upheld the diversity interest,
60
no other Justice had ever joined or endorsed Powell's opinion.
Moreover, even if Powell's opinion had once been binding, the Fifth
Circuit felt the Supreme Court's holding in Adarand and other affirmative action cases handed down after Bakke had eroded it. 6' The
court concluded by boldly proclaiming that "the use of race to achieve
a diverse student body ...

simply cannot be a state interest compel-

ling enough to meet the steep standard of strict scrutiny." 62 Indeed,
the court held that the only interest that could ever be compelling was

m 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
-5 Id. at 938.
56 Id. at 936-38.
57 Id.
58 See id. at 936. Non-minority students with an index score of 192 were in the "presumptive deny" category, while black and Mexican-American students with an index score of 189 fell
into the "presumptive admit" category. Id.
59 Id. at 944 ("[Tlhere has been no indication from the Supreme Court, other than Justice
Powell's lonely opinion in Bakke, that the state's interest in diversity constitutes a compelling
justification for governmental race-based discrimination.").
60 Id. (noting that "only one Justice concluded that race could be used solely for the reason
of obtaining a heterogenous student body").
61 Id. at 945-46 ("[W]e see the caselaw as sufficiently established that the use of ethnic
diversity simply to achieve racial heterogeneity, even as part of the consideration of a number of
factors, is unconstitutional.").
62 Id. at 948.
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that of remedying specific past racial discrimination
on the part of the
63
preference.
racial
the
promoting
institution
In a special concurrence, Judge Wiener disagreed with the
panel's conclusion that diversity could never be a compelling interest.64 Rather, he would have chosen to "assume arguendo that diversity can be a compelling interest but conclude that the admissions
process... was not narrowly tailored to achieve diversity." 65 To extend Supreme Court cases such as Adarand to education, according to
Wiener, was "an extension of the law.., both overly broad and unnecessary to the disposition of [the] case." 66 Noting "the difficulty
inherent in applying Bakke and the minimal guidance in Adarand,"67
Wiener feltit improper to "rush in where the Supreme Court fearsor at least declines-to tread., 68 He then analyzed whether the program was narrowly tailored, concluding that because it used percentages "virtually indistinguishable from quotas" and focused only on
two ethnic groups, blacks and Mexican-Americans, the program
failed strict scrutiny. 69
Although no other court has gone as far as Hopwood in pronouncing the diversity justification to be without merit, a few other
circuits have expressed doubt as to its vitality. In Wessmann v. Gittens, 70 the First Circuit considered the constitutionality of an examination school's admissions program that considered the applicant's race
in admissions decisions.71 Sarah Wessmann, a white student, applied
for and was denied admission to the prestigious Boston Latin
School.72 The school accepted 90 students that year, with the first 45
receiving admittance based solely on a combination of GPA and a
standardized test score. 73 The remaining 45 seats were allocated to
students of various racial groups in the same proportion as each race

63

Id. at 949.

64 Id. at 962 (Wiener, J., specially concurring).
65
6
67

id.
id at 963.

Id. at 964-65 (footnote omitted).

Id. at 965.
69 Il at966.
70 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998).
71 Examination schools offer students an alternative to attending their local secondary
6

school. Usually noted for increased prestige and challenging curriculum, examination schools
attract applicants from across several school districts within a geographic region. Because they
generally receive more applications than they have seats, admissions are selective. Students are
offered seats based on an admissions examination score and the student's prior academic record,
among other factors.
72 Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 793.
73 id.
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appeared in the remaining applicant pool.74 Although Wessmann
ranked 9 1St in the applicant pool, Boston Latin rejected her in favor of
several minority students with
lesser scores, leading her to sue the
75
school selection committee.
The First Circuit, mindful of the Supreme Court precedent on
which the Hopwood panel rested its decision, rejected the selection
committee's asserted interest in a diverse student body.76 However,
in.an opinion akin to Judge Wiener's Hopwood concurrence, the First
Circuit hesitated to foreclose all possibility of the diversity interest
ever being compelling.77 The court instead analyzed the program's
scope, arguing that, by focusing only on racial diversity, the committee ran "afoul of the guidance provided by the principal authority on
which it relies," Powell's opinion in Bakke.78 It concluded that, for a
program to focus solely on racial and ethnic diversity, "the need
would have to be acute-much more acute than the relatively modest
deviations that attend the instant case." 79
One year later the Fourth Circuit handed down a similar ruling in
Eisenberg ex rel. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Public Schools.80
The school district in Montgomery County had developed a magnet
program offering enriched curricula in specific areas, such as math
and science or a foreign language, and sought to attract a diverse
group of applicants from outside each school's geographic region.
Accordingly, the county permitted voluntary student transfers from
one school to another within the county only when the transfer would
not "negatively affect diversity." 81 When Jacob Eisenberg, a white
student, requested a transfer from an overwhelmingly minority
elementary school to a math and science oriented magnet school, the
county denied his request.82

74 Id. For example, for the 1997 entering class, 27.83% of the qualified remaining applicants were black. Therefore, 13 of the 45 remaining seats were filled by the black applicants
with the 13 highest scores. Id.
75 Id. Two applicants, both ranked in the top 45 of the applicant pool, declined to attend
the Boston Latin School. Thus, Wessmann's rank, although not in the top 90, would have ensured her admission to the school if not for the racial preference given to minorities. Id.
76 Id. at 800.
77 See id. at 796. The court, echoing Judge Wiener, chose to "assume arguendo-but
[not] decide-that Bakke remains good law and that some iterations of 'diversity' might be
sufficiently compelling, in specific circumstances, to justify race-conscious actions." Id.
78 Id. at 798.
79 Id.

80 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1019 (2000).

81 Id. at 126. For example, a white student could not generally transfer from a predominantly minority school to a predominantly white school without showing some countervailing
necessity or hardship. Id.
"2 Id. at 127.
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Much like the First Circuit in Wessmann, the Fourth Circuit declined to address diversity as a compelling interest, assuming (without
deciding) that it could be compelling. 83 The court disagreed with
Hopwood's conclusion that the Supreme Court had declared the diversity justification invalid, pointing out that "the Supreme Court has
not decided this issue." 4 As in Wessmann, the court resorted to the
"narrowly tailored" prong of strict scrutiny analysis to strike down the
program. Here, the program's fatal flaw was that it "[did] not allow
85
every applicant for a transfer to be eligible for every available spot."
Instead, it denied or approved transfer requests based on the appliaccording to
cant's race, essentially a form of racial balancing. This, 86
the Fourth Circuit, "was not a narrowly tailored remedy.,
B. Upholding Diversity Beyond Remedying Past Discrimination
In Brewer v. West Irondequoit Central School District,87 the
Second Circuit addressed an interdistrict transfer program initiated to
increase diversity in the public schools within the district.88 The program operated by allowing only minority students to transfer from
schools in the Rochester district to suburban schools, and similarly
permitted only non-minority students to transfer from the suburbs to
the Rochester district.89 A white student denied transfer to a suburban
school from a school within the Rochester district filed suit, alleging
an equal protection violation and seeking a mandatory injunction. 90
school district could preThe district court, expressing doubt that the
91
vail on the merits, granted the injunction.
The Second Circuit, relying on Powell's opinion in Bakke, vacated the injunction.92 In reversing, the appellate court cited two "fatal flaws" in the district court's ruling. 93 First, the ruling improperly
relied on Wygant and Croson for the proposition that a non-remedial

83
84
85
86

Id. at 130.
Id. at 131.
Id. at 133.
I

'7 212 F.3d 738 (2d. Cir. 2000).
s Id. at 742. The stated goal of the program was to reduce "'racial isolation' within the
population of the participating school districts." Id. (quoting Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent.
Sch. Dist., 32 F. Supp. 2d 619,621 (W.D.N.Y. 1999)).
'9 Id. at741.

9 Id.
91 Id. In order to prevail on a motion for a mandatory preliminary injunction, a party must
show (1) that it will be irreparably harmed in the absence of the injunction, and (2) a "clear" or
"substantial" likelihood of success on the merits. Id. at 743-44 (citing Jolly v. Coughlin, 76
F.3d 468, 473 (2d Cir. 1996)).
92 Id. at 753.

93Id. at 748.
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state interest could never satisfy strict scrutiny. 94 This was so because
the Supreme Court had never reached that conclusion, particularly in
the educational domain.95 Second, the district court erred in relying
on Hopwood, "the only [case] since Bakke to hold that a non-remedial
state interest, such as diversity, may never justify race-based programs in the educational context." 96 In doing so, the district court not
only embraced a conclusion that just one circuit had reached, but it
ignored binding Second Circuit precedent, which held that "reducing
de facto segregation, arguably the goal of the [interdistrict transfer
program], serves a compelling government interest. 97 The Second
Circuit concluded by holding that, because reducing de facto segregation is a constitutionally permissible goal, the district court erred in
enjoining a program arguably aimed at that goal.98
The Ninth Circuit has also recognized that a non-remedial purpose can serve as a compelling interest. In Hunter ex rel. Brandt v.
Regents of the University of California,99 the court upheld the ability
of a research-oriented elementary school, operated by UCLA's
Graduate School of Education and Information Studies, to consider
race in its admissions process.1' ° The graduate school used the
elementary school as an experimental laboratory through which it
hoped to conduct research aimed at improving the quality of
education in the Los Angeles elementary school system. In order to
accomplish this goal, the graduate school considered "gender,
race/ethnicity, and family income in its admissions process" in order
to obtain a student population that roughly constituted a cross-section
of the Los Angeles public school system.101 The parents of Keeley
Hunter, a student denied admission to the school, challenged the
94 Id.
95 Id at 748 ("'[N]othing the Court has said [in Wygant] necessarily forecloses the possibility that the Court will find other governmental interests ... "compelling" to sustain the use of
affirmative action policies."') (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286
(1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
96 Id. at 748.
97 Id. at 749. See also Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High Sch. v. Ambach, 738 F.2d
574 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Andrew Jackson If'); Parent Ass'n of Andrew Jackson High Sch. v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1979) ("Andrew Jackson r'). In the Andrew Jackson cases, the
Second Circuit held that, while "there is no judicially-enforceable constitutional obligation,
under existing law, to take affirmative action to remedy racial imbalance," if action is voluntarily undertaken then the goal of reducing de facto segregation could survive strict scrutiny. Andrew Jackson 1, 598 F.2d at 713.
98 Brewer, 212 F.3d at 753.
99 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 877 (2000).
Id. at 1063.
101 Id. at 1062.

'0

The demographic breakdown of the 215 applicants for the 1995-1996
school year (including Hunter, a student described as one-quarter Japanese and three-quarters
Caucasian) was as follows: "110 Caucasians (51.2%); 49 mixed-race (22.8%); 23 AfricanAmericans (10.7%); 19 Asians (8.8%); and 14 Latinos (6.5%). The demographic racial breakdown, as self-reported, of the 46 admitted applicants was as follows: 18 Caucasians (39.1%); 8
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nied admission to the school, challenged the constitutionality of the
admissions process.
The court, after reviewing testimony by leading educators as to
the problems facing urban education, found that "the defendants' interest in operating a research-oriented elementary school is compelling. 10 2 In doing so, the court deliberately rejected the notion that
only remedial interests can justify racial consideration in admissions.10 3 Echoing Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, the court also
discussed the important role of education and public schooling, noting
that they are "'p)erhaps the most important function of state and local
governments."' 4 Furthermore, the court found the program narrowly tailored to its goal because, in light of the small number of students admitted to the elementary school, "it would not be possible,
nor would it be reasonable, to require the [school] to attempt to obtain
an ethnically diverse representative sample of students without the
use of specific racial targets and classifications.''10 5 Therefore, the
court felt it should "defer to researchers' decisions about what they
need for their research."' I 6
II[. COMPELLING INTERESTS: THE FIRST EQUAL PROTECTION PRONG

The decisions in the various circuit courts, as noted above, have
encompassed a broad spectrum of possible outcomes when the courts
have faced the issue of whether a diverse population in a public
school is a compelling goal. The Supreme Court, possessing the
power to choose which cases it will hear, has added to the confusion
by failing to address the vitality of the diversity justification in education. The time to answer this question is overdue-a problem that
will doubtless be remedied in the near future. When that time comes,
the Supreme Court should look in two places for the answer to the
diversity question. First, it should consider the vast body of modem
educational research indicating the importance of diversity to effective education. Second, it should recognize the inapplicability of
marketplace and workplace affirmative action cases to the narrow
mixed-race (17.4%); 6 African-Americans (13%); 4 Asians (8.7%); and 10 Latinos (21.7%)."
Id. at 1068 n.5.
102 Id. at 1064.
103 Id. at 1064 n.6 ("The Supreme Court has never held that only a state's interest in remedial action can meet strict scrutiny.").
't" Id. at 1063 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). The court in
Hunteralso quoted several other Supreme Court decisions voicing the same proposition. See,
e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) ("Providing public schools ranks at the very
apex of the function of a State.").
105 Hunter, 190 F.3d at 1066 (giving significant weight to the testimony of numerous educational researchers in arriving at this conclusion).
106 id.
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issue of diversity in education. Instead, the Court should embrace
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke and the conclusions of Hunter,
Brewer, and other cases upholding diversity in public schools.
A. How the Supreme Court Can UpholdDiversity as a Compelling
EducationalInterest
Any judicial ruling upholding the diversity interest in education
would clearly begin with Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. Powell's
words have been the cornerstone on which every effort to increase
diversity through racial consideration in admissions has rested. In
order, then, to assess whether diversity is compelling, the question
must be answered: Is Bakke still valid precedent? If Bakke survives,
then Hopwood is incorrect, and diversity (as well as other nonremedial interests) can satisfy strict scrutiny if narrowly tailored. On
the other hand, if subsequent Supreme Court jurisprudence overturned
Bakke, then no foundation exists on which to rest the diversity interest.
Close examination of this question reveals several indications
that Bakke has endured as a legitimate precedent in support of diversity. Although the Supreme Court has gutted affirmative action programs in the workplace and marketplace, in most circumstances requiring specific findings of past discrimination to uphold racial preferences, it has left room for a holding that diversity can still be compelling in education. 10 7 Indeed, no Supreme Court majority has ever
held that diversity cannot serve as a compelling interest.10 8 The vast
differences between diversity in the economic sector and diversity in
education serve to distinguish cases such as Wygant and Adarand.1°9
Education has long held a special status in the courts. It is "perhaps the most important function of state and local governments,"' 10

107 See generally Philip T.K. Daniel & Kyle Edward Timken, The Rumors of My Death
Have Been Exaggerated: Hopwood's Error in "Disregarding"Bakke, 28 J.L & EDUC. 391
(1999) (arguing that the decision in Hopwood overstepped its authority by precluding the use of
diversity as a compelling state interest). See also Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Hopwood, Bakke,
and the Future of the Diversity Justification,29 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1, 40 (1998) ("Since Bakke,
the Court has not decided another educational admissions case nor has it purported to confront
the Powell opinion directly. Therefore... Bakke is still good law ....");Marty B. Lorenzo,
Race-ConsciousDiversity Admissions Programs: Furtheringa Compelling Interest, 2 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 361, 389 (1997) ("[T]he reason no case has affirmed educational diversity as a compelling interest is only because the issue has not yet come before the Court.").
logSee Lorenzo, supra note 107, at 390 ("[T]he Supreme Court has not declared the use of
race as a criterion for diversity to be unconstitutional.").
'09See Daniel & Timken, supra note 107, at 400 ("The cases that the Hopwood court relied upon [in limiting diversity] were totally unrelated to higher education admissions programs
and thus reliance upon them is tenuous at best.").
110Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954).
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ranking at the "very apex of the function of a State." '
Justice Powell, in Bakke, noted that "[a]cademic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment."' 12 Education involves the
"'robust exchange of ideas,""' 3 an exchange clearly not found in construction contracts and employment. As stated by the Second Circuit,
"desegregation of a student population in the public school system...
is more compelling than reduction of racial isolation or underrepresentation in the commercial context-teachers' 'jobs
and the construc4
tion industry-at issue in Wygant and Croson.""
The awarding of a construction contract, in contrast, hardly invokes First Amendment rights or an "exchange of ideas." An employment dispute does not foster in people the lifelong impressions of
other racial groups that children first form in school.115 A construction contract granting a percentage of the total contract amount to minorities benefits only the minority-usually at the expense of another,
non-minority business. Diversity in education, on the other hand,
benefits all children, particularly at a young age. 116 Furthermore,
while racial preferences in the commercial context breed competition
and animosity between those benefited and those burdened, diversity
in education can promote friendship, familiarity, and mutual
under17
standing between those of differing race and background.
"'

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,213 (1972).

112 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978). Powell went onto list

the "'four essential freedoms' of a university-to determine for itself on academic grounds who
may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study." Id.
(quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in
result)) (emphasis added).
113 Id. (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
114 Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 751 (2d Cir. 2000).
115 See Janet Ward Schofield, Review of Research on School Desegregation'sImpact on
Elementary and Secondary School Students, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON MULTICULTURAL
EDUCATION 597 (James A. Banks & Cherry A. McGee Banks eds., 1995) (noting that interracial
interaction at a young age helps children to form positive impressions of those of a different
race).
116 See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 315 (1986) ("[O]ne of the most
important lessons that the American public schools teach is that the diverse ethnic, cultural, and
national backgrounds that have been brought together in our famous 'melting pot' do not identify essential differences among the human beings that inhabit our lInd. It is one thing for a
white child to be taught by a white teacher that color, like beauty, is only 'skin deep'; it is far
more.convincing to experience that truth on a day-to-day basis during the routine, ongoing
learning process.") (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117 See Schofield, supra note 115, at 610. See also Joanna R. Zahler, Note, Lessons in
Humanity: Diversity as a Compelling State Interest in Public Education, 40 B.C. L. REv. 995,
1024-25 (1999) (citing Schofield and arguing that diversity in education serves a compelling
interest by fostering friendship between white and minority students at a young age). Zahler
cites Schofield's discussion of a 1979 National Opinion Research Center Survey finding that
"white students in desegregated schools situations were more likely to report having a close
African-American friend and having had African-American friends visit their homes." Zahler,
supra,at 1025. Schofield also found that increased social interaction between white and minor-
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Hand in hand with the notion that education is a vital aspect of
state and local government is the principle that courts should defer to
local school administrators regarding educational policy. 1 8 In Swann
v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education,119 the Supreme Court
stated in dicta that school authorities should have "broad power to
formulate and implement educational policy," including prescribing
percentages of minority students "in order to prepare students to live
in a pluralistic society. ' 120 Admittedly, the Swann Court directed
these words toward a different situation-admonishing federal courts
against infringing on the discretion of local school officials by imposing desegregation remedies on school districts where only de facto
segregation existed. 121 However, at least one circuit court has cited
Swann in support of the contention that school officials may voluntarily formulate measures designed to "remedy de facto segregation existing in schools."1 22 This ruling is supported by the belief that school
officials, having built careers by determining how to most effectively
educate children, possess special
expertise in their field with which
23
courts should not interfere.
Another indication of Bakke's enduring legacy is the repeated
citations made to it by Supreme Court justices in other cases. Most
significantly, the Metro Broadcasting Court adopted Powell's diversity justification in upholding diversity in broadcasting. 24 Although
Adarand overturned Metro Broadcasting,it only did so with regards
to Metro Broadcasting's application of intermediate scrutiny to the
race-based classification in question. 2 5 As the dissent in Adarand
pointed out, the diversity justification was never asserted in Adarand;
ity students at a young age resulted in each group forming more positive impressions of the
other. Schofield, supra, at 610.
118 See, e.g., Wygant, 476 U.S. at 315 (1986) (listing several Supreme Court cases promoting deference to local school officials).
"9 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
f0 Id. at 16.

121 See Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 796-97 (1st Cir. 1998) (rejecting the school
officials' argument that Sivann gave them the discretion to implement race-based admissions
policies).
122 Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 751 (2d Cir. 2000). See also
Willan v. Menomonee Falls Sch. Bd., 658 F. Supp. 1416, 1422 (E.D. Wis. 1987) ("It is wellsettled in federal law that state and local school authorities may voluntarily adopt plans to promote integration even in the absence of a specific finding of past discrimination."). Remedying
de facto segregation has been described as "a negatively-phrased expression for attaining the
opposite of racial isolation which is racial diversity." Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch.
Dist., 32 F. Supp. 2d 619, 627 (W.D.N.Y. 1999), vacated, 212 F.3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000).
123 See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 230 (1985) (Powell, J.,
concurring) ("Judicial review of academic decisions, including those with respect to the admission or dismissal of students, is rarely appropriate .... ").
12 Metro Broad., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n., 497 U.S. 547, 567-68 (1990),
overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
'2 Adarand,515 U.S. at 226-27 (1995).
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thus, the majority's decision did not decide the question 1of
26 whether
diversity could serve as a compelling interest in the future.
In Wygant, Justice O'Connor noted that "nothing the Court has
said today necessarily forecloses the possibility that the Court will
find other governmental interests which have been relied upon in the
lower courts but which have not been passed on here to be sufficiently... 'compelling' to sustain the use of affirmative action policies."' 27 Similarly, in Croson, the Court did not address the diversity
question because the only justification raised was remedying past discrimination.'2
Although in both cases the Court struck down
affirmative action programs, neither case specifically struck down the
diversity justification.
In Croson, Justice O'Connor struck down the construction contract set-aside by relying on Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke for the
proposition that all race-based classifications should be subjected to
strict scrutiny. 129 Furthermore, she followed Bakke in holding that
racial classifications enacted for remedial purposes must address specific instances of past discrimination rather than generalized assertions. 30 Despite these repeated citations to Justice Powell's opinion,
Justice O'Connor failed even once to mention the diversity justification in Croson. Moreover, no other Justice wrote against diversity as
a compelling interest, despite the obvious opportunity to do so. At
the least, this implies that Croson did not intend to3bury the diversity
justification, and, in fact, the justification survives.1 1
A final indication of the educational diversity justification's enduring potency is the reliance several circuit and district courts have
placed on Justice Powell's opinion. Of these, the Brewer and Hunter
decisions, discussed above, are the most germane. Both cases addressed race-based programs designed to encourage diversity at the
grade school level, and both upheld the school's use of race for that
purpose. Brewer discussed Bakke and its progeny at length and con12 Id. at 257-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The proposition that fostering diversity may
provide a sufficient interest to justify such a program is not inconsistent with the Court's holding
today-indeed, the question is not remotely presented in this case ....).
127 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 286 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
128 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down a city's
plan, which required prime contractors to subcontract at least 30% of each contract to minority
business enterprises, because the city failed to demonstrate a compelling government interest by
identifying past discrimination).
I' Id. at494.
"o kL at 496-98.
131 See Daniel & Timken, supra note 107, at 402 ("[T]he CrosoA Court, relying on Bakke,
could have easily dismissed the diversity rationale as a compelling state interest. But, the plurality opinion, the concurrence, and the dissent all lack any critique of the diversity rationale.
These factors alone highlight the fact that the diversity rationale remains an appropriate compelling interest in the field of higher education and perhaps elsewhere.").
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32
cluded that Justice Powell's opinion remained valid precedent.
Hunter, although it did not explicitly mention Bakke, nevertheless
reached the same conclusion-that the Supreme Court "has never
held that
only a state's interest in remedial action can meet strict scru, 33
tiny."
In addition to Brewer and Hunter, some recent decisions addressing university and graduate school admissions have likewise followed Bakke and concluded that an interest in diversity can be compelling. In Smith v. University of Washington Law School,134 the
Ninth Circuit held that they would not "declare that the Bakke rationale regarding university admissions policies has become moribund,"
but rather that race could permissibly be a factor in admissions decisions. 35 In arriving at this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit relied on several Supreme Court decisions which, when considered
together, "re136
quired" the court to uphold the diversity justification.
The Ninth Circuit scrutinized Bakke through the lens of Marks v.
United States, 137 which held that "[w]hen a fragmented Court decides
a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent
of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds. ' , 138 Under this approach, the court determined
that, although Justice Stevens' opinion provided the necessary votes
to strike down the Davis admissions program, a majority of the Justices "would have allowed for some race-based considerations in educational institutions, both under Title VI and under the Fourteenth
Amendment."' 139 Therefore, the narrower of Justice Powell and Justice Brennan's opinions would qualify as the Court's holding under
the Marks analysis. 140 The Ninth Circuit then concluded that because

Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 747-49 (2d Cir. 2000).
Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061, 1064 n.6 (9th Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 186 (2000).
'34 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 2192 (2001). The conflict arose
when three white applicants to the University of Washington Law School were denied admission. They sued, alleging that the law school's admissions process discriminated against Caucasians by using race as an admissions criterion. l at 1191.
135 Id. at 1200-01 ("[T]he Fourteenth Amendment permits University admissions programs
which consider race for other than remedial purposes, and educational diversity is a compelling
government interest that meets the demands of strict scrutiny of race-conscious measures.").
136 Id. at 1200.
137 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
"' Smith, 233 F.3d at 1199 (quoting Marks, 430 U.S. at 193).
139 Id. See also Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 819 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (agreeing
with Smith that "five justices reached the same conclusion ... that universities may take race
into account in admissions when done so properly ...").
'40 Smith, 233 F.3d at 1200. Both Justice Powell and Justice Brennan allowed for the use
of race in admissions in circumstances beyond remedying past discrimination. See Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
132

133
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"virtually every point in Justice Brennan's opinion would establish
broader grounds for allowing [consideration of race], . . . Justice
Powell's analysis is the narrowest footing upon which a raceconscious decision making process could stand. 1 I
Having determined that Justice Powell's opinion constituted the
holding of the Bakke Court regarding the diversity justification, the
Ninth Circuit moved on to consider whether his words had been undermined by subsequent Supreme Court decisions. In language implicitly critical of the outcome in Hopwood, the panel reminded circuit courts of their duty to follow clear Supreme Court precedent until
such time as that Court determines to reverse itself.142 Because the
Supreme Court had never explicitly overruled Bakke, the Ninth Cir143
cuit concluded that diversity could still be compelling in education.
Even Wessmann and Eisenberg, two decisions that struck down
race-based programs, recognized that the diversity justification might
potentially endure. Although each questioned whether the justification had survived Wygant andAdarand, both left that determination to
the Supreme Court, and instead focused their attention on whether the
programs addressed were narrowly tailored. 144 This approach recognizes that the Supreme Court, should it choose to do so, can still pronounce that educational diversity is a compelling interest without upsetting its own precedent.
B. Why the Supreme CourtShould Uphold Diversity as a Compelling
Interest
The difficulty in establishing the importance of diversity to the
educational growth of children of both the minority and non-minority
races is well-documented. 145 Courts have hesitated to uphold the diversity justification based only on generalized, lofty statements of the
141
142

Smith, 233 F.3d at 1200.
See id. See also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) ("[O]ther courts should

[not] conclude [that] our more recent cases have, by implication, overruled an earlier precedent."); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) ("If a
precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in
some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.").
4 See Smith, 233 F.3d at 1200.
14 See Eisenberg ex rel Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 197 F.3d 123, 130
(4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1420 (2000) ('We will assume, without holding.... that
diversity may be a compelling governmental interest, and proceed to examine whether the transfer policy is narrowly tailored to achieve diversity."); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 796
(lst Cir. 1998) (assuming Bakke remains good law).
141 See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 796 ("The word 'diversity,' like any other abstract concept,
does not admit of permanent, concrete definition."). See also John Friedl, Making a Compelling
Case for Diversity in College Admissions, 61 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 29-32 (1999) (discussing the
lack of concrete, empirical evidence substantiating the value of diversity in education).
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benefits of diversity. 146 However, until recently nothing more existed
to substantiate the value of a diverse classroom than evidence of an
anecdotal nature.' 47
In response to the great need for concrete research supporting
diversity, many studies have attempted to give substance to the argument. Researchers have examined the impact of racial diversity on
both minority and white students, at the grade school, university, and
graduate school levels.1 48 These efforts consistently find that diversity enhances a student's education by providing two types of distinct
benefits: academic benefits, such as an increase in test scores and intellectual growth, and social benefits, such
as greater interaction and
149
goodwill between those of different races.
1.

Diversity's Impact on Academic Success

A substantial body of research has attempted to isolate the role
diversity plays in academic achievement. Most recently, a study conducted by Patricia Gurin, Professor of Psychology and Women's
Studies at the University of Michigan, concluded that the academic
success of a student could be promoted by surrounding the student
with classmates of different backgrounds and races. 150 Gurin's study,
relied on heavily in a recent district court case upholding the University of Michigan's race-conscious admissions program, utilized data
collected from nearly 200 colleges and universities in reaching its
conclusions. 151 The benefits to students identified in her study include growth in intellectual and academic skills, heightened potential
for critical thinking, increased intellectual motivation and engagement
in active thinking processes, and a greater ability to understand and
consider multiple perspectives and deal with the conflicts that different perspectives sometimes create.152 Students who learn in a diverse
environment also demonstrate an ability to offer more creative solu-

146

See Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 797 ("[Any proponent of any notion of diversity could

recite a... litany of virtues. Hence, an inquiring court cannot content itself with abstractions.").
147 See Friedl, supra note 145, at 29-32 ("To date, almost all of the evidence in support of
diversity in higher education is anecdotal in nature ... ").
148 See, e.g., Schofield, supra note 115 (studying diversity at the elementary school level);
Patricia
Gurin,
Expert
Report
of
Patricia
Gurin,
available
at
http://www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/ expert/gurintoc.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2001)
(assessing diversity at the university level).
149 See Zahler, supra note 117, at 1021-26 (noting that, while an increase in test scores and
similar academic indicators may be linked to racial diversity, the greatest benefit to students
derives from social interaction between races).
SO See Gurin, supra note 148.
""'Id. See also Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 822-23 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (discussing Gurim's studies and concluding that diversity in admissions is a compelling interest).
152

See Gurin, supra note 148.
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tions to problems than do students from homogenous classrooms.
In addition, students from diverse schools are more active in democratic participation and citizenship. 154 For each of these benefits
Gurin's "analyses show[ed] a striking pattern of consistent, positive
relationships between student learning in college and both classroom
diversity and informal interactional diversity. '15 5 Furthermore, Gurin
noted that these benefits increase as the diversity of the institution
increases. 56
Significantly, Gurin also discovered that, for white students, the
results were "especially impressive."' 57 After interacting with students of other races, white students demonstrated "increased scores
on the measures of complex thinking and social/historical thinking,"
increased "drive to achieve, intellectual self-confidence, and goals for
creating original works," heightened "post-graduate degree aspirations," and "growth in students values placed on their intellectual and
academic skills."' 8 Gurin attributes this increase in intellectual ability to the challenges presented to students by interaction with those of
different races.1 59 Specifically, she contends that by encountering
"novel situation[s]," such as interracial interaction, students are
forced to abandon automatic, routine modes of thought in favor of
"effortful and conscious modes of thought."' 60 Therefore, she concluded that diversity is essential to training students to be complex,
sophisticated thinkers.161
While Gurin's studies assessed diversity at the university level,
many researchers have tried to quantify the impact of diversity on
elementary and secondary school children. Along these lines, several
studies comparing student performance on standardized tests in integrated and segregated schools are particularly illuminating. 162 A
1993-1994 study comparing student scores on the Iowa Test of Basic
Skills showed that black students in mostly segregated schools failed
to reach the national average for their age bracket, while black stu153 Id.

154 I See also Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 822-23 (summarizing the benefits cited by
Gurin's study).
15 See Gurin, supranote 148.
l-6 Id. ("Social diversity is especially likely to increase effortful, active thinking when
institutions of higher education capitalize on these conditions in the classroom and provide a
climate in which students from diverse backgrounds frequently interact with each other.").
'S7 Id.

15s Id.
159See id.
160 md.
161 See id.
162 See GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1996). Orfield and Eaton challenge the recent

trend of school districts reverting to segregation by ceasing to take measures to ensure diversity.
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dents in integrated schools exceeded the national average. 163 Furthermore, scores for both white and black students rose by approximately 20 points during a period of time when busing promoted racial
diversity in the area schools.164
Another study, based on results of the Virginia Literacy Testing
Program, found that students in integrated schools outperformed students in segregated schools in "all subject areas [and] in every
grade." 165 In particular, the passing rates for writing and math were
substantially higher in the more diverse schools. 166 A comparison of
student scores on the Science Research Associates Assessment Survey Series confirmed these results, finding that black student's scores
decreased after the area's reversion to segregated schools. 167 Researcher Vivian Ipka concluded that "[s]egregated educational settings may serve to retard the development of children."' 168 In contrast,
students in racially diverse settings demonstrated enhanced development.1 69
These studies were not alone in finding that diversity in the
classroom can increase academic performance.
Janet Ward
Schofield, a leading researcher on the effects of racial integration,
concluded that significant gains in the test scores of minority students,
particularly in reading and English, resulted from racially integrated
classrooms.170 Moreover, in a study commissioned by the Connecticut State Department of Education, Schofield found that these gains

163

Id. at 130-31.

This study, conducted by Susan Eaton and Christina Meldrum, took

place after local school officials in Norfolk, Virginia were given permission to end courtordered busing. The end of busing, and subsequent return to neighborhood schooling, resulted
in many integrated schools becoming segregated. The purpose behind the study was to assess
the academic impact on students from this return to segregation. Eaton and Meldrum's data
came from students in the same school districts and schools, taken before and after those
schools "resegregated." Thus, their results cannot be explained away by suggesting that the
students in the integrated schools received increased funds, better teachers, or superior curriculum. Id.
164 Id. at 132. This Note does not intend to express any arguments for or against busing as
a remedy for segregation. However, because busing is a remedy designed, in essence, to force
school diversity, these studies are highly relevant to assessing the academic impact of diversity.
165 Id. at 133.
16 Id. The passing rates in writing and math in the segregated schools were 57 and 61
percent, respectively. These rates rose to 70 and 82 percent in integrated school settings.
167 Id. at 132-33. For black students, the mean score decreased from 52 to 47. In order to
obtain accurate results, the study controlled for several factors including "school racial composition, teacher and student expenditures, instructional materials, substitute and teacher salaries, the
age of school buildings, teacher education levels and library size." Id.
168 Id. at 131 (quoting Ipka, a researcher from the University of Central Florida).
169 Id.
170 Schofield, supra note 115, at 610-11.
See also Zahler, supra note 117, at 1025
(discussing Schofield's findings).
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intensified when desegregation began in the first grade.17 1 Yet another study, by Robert Crain and Rita Mahard, found that the benefits
of desegregation became of greater significance when integration began at 2an early age and persisted throughout the student's school
17
years.
Although both Schofield's work and Crain and Mahard's research found test score gains to be statistically significant, they both
described these increases as "modest. 173 Nonetheless, at least one
leading researcher contends that their significance may be underestimated. Desegregation expert Gary Orfield notes that "few educational reforms . . . show unambiguous short-term impacts on test
scores."' 74 In fact, Orfield points out that none of the major education
reform proposals of the past generation resulted in large, immediate
test score gains. 75 Therefore, the "modest" gains attributed to diverse
classrooms compare quite favorably to other education reforms. 76
Orfield goes on to suggest that the true measure of diversity, as asserted by Crain
and Mahard, can only be assessed over a longer pe177
riod of time.
2.

Diversity'sImpact on Social Benefits

Notwithstanding the evidence demonstrating the purely intellectual benefits diversity confers upon students, many researchers feel
the social gains attributed to diversity are even more substantial. 78 A
1970s study conducted at Johns Hopkins suggested that test scores
were an inadequate measure of diversity's value. 179 Instead, the researchers asserted that desegregation benefited minority students most
by offering them access to opportunities previously available only to
whites. 180 They described segregation as "isolation from mainstream
171 See GARY ORFIELD & CAROLE ASHKINAZE, THE CLOSING DOOR: CONSERVATIVE

POLICY AND BLACK OPPORTUNrrY 130 (1991). Schofield also found overwhelming evidence
that desegregation did not harm the academic achievement of white children. lI
172ORFIELD & EATON, supranote 162, at 105.
173Id.
'74 Id. at 104.
171 Id. at 104-05.
176 Id.
'77 Id. at 105.

178See Zahler, supra note 117, at 1021-22.
179 See JoMills Henry Braddock I & James M. McPartland, Social-PsychologicalProcesses that Perpetuate Racial Segregation: The Relationship Between School and Employment
Desegregation, 19 J. BLACK STUD. 267, 285-86 (1989) (discussing the need for further studies
on the social-psychological factors that perpetuate segregation at various stages of life). See
also ORFIELD & ASHKINAZE, supranote 171, at 130 (discussing the "dramatic impacts of desegregation ... in areas other than achievement scores").
I8o See generally Braddock & McPartland, supra note 179, at 286 (concluding that early
school desegregation promotes adult desegregation in work environments); ORFIELD & ASHINAZE, supra note 171, at 130 (concluding that students from integrated schools were more
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opportunities," and found that integration offered minorities previously denied access to higher education, employment, and choice of
community. 181 Other researchers have referred to this cycle of isolation as "perpetuation theory," and found that students who attend diverse secondary schools are statistically more likely to break the cycle
and enjoy college and career success
later in life than those students
82
from racially homogenous schools.
Interaction with a diverse student body benefits both white and
minority students in another significant way: by challenging and eroding the harmful prejudice, fear, and mistrust that can exist between
races. Experts in social learning state that prejudices are acquired
"relatively early in a child's life" and can lead to "hostile-aggressive
183
responses" when children interact with the target of the prejudice.
Overwhelming evidence, however, indicates these prejudices are
minimized when students interact with those of other races at early
ages. 184
Schofield, for example, conducted an intensive study of a racially diverse middle school and found that "black and white children
became somewhat more friendly and willing to work with each other"
during their time at the school. 185 Sharing a classroom with students
of other races also helped alleviate the initial fear of black classmates
that is well-documented in many white children. 186 They learned to
recognize black classmates as individuals, rather than as members of
a race. 187 Avoidance of other-race students decreased, and children
likely to attend selective colleges, live in integrated neighborhoods, and find employment in
growth sectors of the economy).
181ORFIELD & EATON, supra note 162, at 105 (summarizing the findings of Braddock,
McPartland, and Robert Crain in the Johns Hopkins study).
182 See Amy Stuart Wells & Robert L. Crain, Perpetuation Theory and the Long-Term
Effects of School Desegregation, 64 REv. OF EDuc. RES. 531, 532-33 (1994) (explaining that
segregation tends to repeat itself across the stages of the life cycle if the cycle is not broken by
sustained experiences in desegregated settings early in life). See also ORFIELD & EATON, supra
note 162, at 106; Zahler, supranote 117, at 1022. The findings of Wells and Crain were based
on the results of twenty-one studies of the long-term effects of desegregation. Wells & Crain,
supra,at 531-32.
183 ALBERT BANDURA & RICHARD H. WALTERS, SOCIAL LEARNING AND PERSONALITY
DEVELOPMENT 19 (1963). As an example, the authors cite the aggressive behavior Southern
children demonstrated towards minorities after observing similar behavior from their parents.
Id.
184See Peter M. Hall, Race, Ethnicity, and Schooling in America: An Introduction, in
RACE, ETHNICITY, AND MULTICULTURALISM: POLICY AND PRACTICE 18-19 (Peter M. Hall ed.,

1997) (summarizing the results of several studies finding that children from racially diverse
classrooms are more likely to have friends of other races and work in racially diverse environments as adults).
185 JANET WARD SCHOFIELD, BLACK AND WHITE IN SCHOOL: TRUST, TENSION, OR TOL-

ERANCE? 181 (1983).
186 See id. at 161-67.
187See id. at 167-70.
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became more accepting of those different than themselves. 8
Research has shown these results to be most acute when teachers
and authority figures within the school actively encourage integration
and punish racially motivated negative behavior.18 9 These results ar
also maximized when cooperative learning techniques are used to
encourage students to work together for a common goal with students
of other races.190 Both of these features, an authority structure and a
cooperative, reward-based learning system, naturally exist in many
elementary and middle schools. This makes these schools an ideal
forum for this type of social growth and learning,
making diversity
"more important at this stage than at any other. ' 191
IV. NARROWLY TAILORED: THE SECOND EQUAL PROTECTION
PRONG

An analysis of diversity in education, and its ability to serve as a
compelling interest, would not be complete without also considering
the second prong of strict scrutiny: the requirement that the racial
preference program be narrowly tailored to the diversity-related goals
it espouses. If a program is not the least restrictive means of achieving its goal, it will fail strict scrutiny despite promoting a compelling

interest. This prevents school districts from overzealously implementing racial preferences without a compelling need for them. Otherwise, as noted by the dissent in Hunter,"[e]very stratum of a state's
public education system ... may now, in the name of 'research on

'8 See id. at 156-61.

189See id. at 29. The notion that children's undesirable behavior can be changed by correction and reinforcement from authority figures is supported by social learning theory. See
Bandura & Walters, supra note 183, at 10 ("[R]einforcement procedures are more effective
when the agent of reward is a high-prestige person .. "). See also Schofield, supranote 115,
at 608; Zahler, supranote 117, at 1024.
190See BANDURA & WALTERS, supra note 183, at 4-6 (discussing the role of rewards in
social learning); Hall, supra note 184, at 13-15 (discussing the benefits of cooperative learning
for racially diverse classes). See also Deborah A. Byrnes, Addressing Race, Ethnicity and Culture in the Classroom, in COMMON BONDS: ANTI-BIAs TEACHING IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY 11,
15 (Deborah A. Byrnes & Gary Kiger eds., 2d ed. 1996) ("One of the most effective ways students become more accepting of others is through cooperative-learning groups. Research on
cooperative grouping shows increased academic achievement, as well as improved interracial
relations.") (citations omitted).
191 Boston's Children First v. City of Boston, 62 F. Supp. 2d 247, 259 (D. Mass. 1999)
(recognizing the importance of diversity at the elementary school level to children's social
growth), mandamus granted,In re Boston's Children First, 244 F.3d 164 (1st Cir. 2001) (granting mandamus to address improper comments the trial judge made to the press rather than the
merits of the decision); Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 19 F. Supp. 2d 449, 455
(D. Md. 1998), rev'd sub nom Eisenberg ex rel. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs.,
197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied,529 U.S. 1019 (2000) ("Where children first begin to
forge social relationships and interactions with their peers... the need for diversity is at its
greatest.").
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effective educational
strategies,' implement a racially classified ad' 192
system."
missions
Many appellate court cases, rather than state that diversity in
education is a compelling interest, have circumvented the issue by
193
assuming that it can be (while awaiting a Supreme Court decision).
In many cases, these courts have then struck down the racial preference programs for failing to narrowly tailor the program's means to
its ends. 194 By cumulating the factors that failed strict scrutiny review
in each of these cases, a blueprint for how to narrowly tailor a racebased school program emerges. In order to survive judicial examination, the program should possess the following features: it should be
flexible, rather than based on quotas or set-asides; it should consider
diversity as a whole, including characteristics beyond race; and it
should provide an alternative for any student denied admission.
A. Flexibility
A common theme throughout affirmative action cases, including
those considering diversity in education, is intolerance for racial quotas and set-asides. Justice Powell expressed this in Bakke, writing,
"assignment of a fixed number of places to a minority group is not a
necessary means toward [educational diversity].' 95 In a constitutionally permissible program, a student cannot be "foreclosed from all
consideration for [a] seat simply because he was not the right color or
had the wrong surname."' 196 Rather, race simply should serve as an
indicator of the potential of that student to contribute to the diversity
of the school and should count only minimally towards admission for
that student. 197 Only when the student's "combined qualifications,
which may [include] similar nonobjective factors," outweigh those of
another student should one be accepted and the other rejected. 198 In
other words, the program should "treat[] each applicant as an individual in the admissions process. 199

192 Hunter ex rel. Brandt v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061, 1075 (9th Cir.
1999) (Beezer, J., dissenting), cert. denied,531 U.S. 877 (2000).
13 See, e.g., Eisenberg ex rel. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 197 F.3d 123
(4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1019 (2000); Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st
Cir. 1998).
194See Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 131-33; Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 798-800.
195 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316 (1978).
196 Id. at 318.
197 Id. An example of this would be the "Harvard Plan" described by Justice Powell,
where race counts as a "plus" in an applicant's file.
198 Id.
199 Id.
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This theme is echoed in recent decisions such as Wessmann. 00
The First Circuit equated Boston Latin's admissions scheme with the
strict set-aside forbidden by Bakke, noting that, once the allotted slots
available to persons of a certain race were filled, applicants of that
race were foreclosed for consideration for the other slots. 20° This ran
afoul of the Bakke requirement that no student be eliminated from all
consideration for a seat because of his or her race.2 °2 Similarly, the
transfer program at issue in Eisenberg did not survive judicial review
because the school district grounded its transfer decisions in maintaining racial balance at each school. 20 3 In other words, it was no more
than racial balancing based on countywide racial percentages. 204 Programs such as these lack flexibility and deny students their right to
individual consideration for every available seat, and therefore will
not meet the constitutional requirement that the program be narrowly
tailored.
On the other hand, race-based programs that "[do] not utilize
rigid quotas or seek to admit a predetermined number of minority students" have been upheld. 20 5 The University of Michigan allows admissions counselors to "flag" applications submitted by students who
possess characteristics "deem[ed] important to the composition of its
freshman class," including whether the student is a member of an
"under-represented race., 20 6 These "flags" keep applicants who may
not initially meet the threshold for admission in the qualified pool for
further review. 20 7 Like Justice Powell's "plus" in an applicant's file,
the University of Michigan's admissions system effectively considers
race without setting aside places solely for minorities. 208
Admittedly, the University of Michigan's admissions system is
of limited use to elementary schools. Elementary school students are
"'unlikely... [to] have extensive resumes which may be weighed and
considered in addition to their race in [formulating] diverse class-

?w 160 F.3d 790, 800 (lst Cir. 1998).
201 Id.

2m Id. ("The Policy does precisely what Justice Powell deemed anathematic: at a certain
point, it effectively forecloses some candidates from all consideration for a seat at an examination school simply because of the racial or ethnic category in which they fall.").
Eisenberg ex reL Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 197 F.3d 123, 131 (4th
Cir. 1999).
W4

Id.

"5 Gratz v. Bollinger, 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 827 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
w6 ld. The court also upheld the University's practice of adding points to the index scores
of under-represented minority students.
2071d.

IId. at 827-28. But see Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001)
(holding that the University of Michigan Law School's admissions program was unconstitutional because it focused only on race in attempting to foster diversity).
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rooms. ''2°9 However, many magnet and examination schools have
admissions programs that resemble those of selective colleges and
universities. 210 For these schools, utilizing "flags" and "pluses"
would be a narrowly tailored means of enhancing racial diversity.
B. ConsiderAll Aspects of Diversity
Perhaps the most significant factor in whether a race-based admissions program is sufficiently narrow to survive judicial review is
the program's attention to all details of diversity, rather than simply
race. A program claiming to promote diversity while focusing solely
on race will almost always be defeated in the courts. 211 '"True" diversity, the goal towards which any permissible race-based admissions
program should strive, also includes gender, religion, socio-economic
background, physical abilities, and class. Furthermore, it encompasses the totality of traits, achievements, characteristics, and unique
skills that shape each person's personality.212
Justice Powell found this notion paramount in his opinion in
Bakke. He pointed out that "[t]he diversity that furthers a compelling
state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and
characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though
important element. 2 1 3 The admissions set-aside in Bakke that focused only on race would "hinder, rather than further attainment of
genuine diversity" because it failed to recognize diversity beyond
race. 214 Quoting from a brief submitted as amici curiae by several
prominent universities, Justice Powell's opinion recognized that "a
farm boy from Idaho can bring something to Harvard College that a
Bostonian cannot offer. Similarly, a black student can usually bring
something that a white person cannot offer." 215 What Justice Powell
also seemed to recognize is that, in many instances, a white student
from Idaho may offer more to true diversity than a black student from
Boston. Focusing solely on race, in such situations, might result in
209 Boston's Children First v. City of Boston, 62 F. Supp. 2d 247, 259 (D. Mass. 1999)
(quoting Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 19 F. Supp. 2d 449, 454-55 (D. Md.
1998), rev'd sub nom Eisenberg ex rel. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 197 F.3d
123 (4th Cir. 1999)), mandamus granted,In re Boston's Children First, 244 F.3d 164 (Ist Cir.
2001).
210 The Boston Latin examination school challenged in Wessmann, for example, used an
admissions system similar to those used in higher education. See Wessmann v. Gittens, 160
F.3d 790, 793-94 (1st Cir. 1998).
211 See, e.g., Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 797-98 (striking down an admissions program that
sought to obtain a "racial mix," rather than true diversity).
212 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978).
213 id

Id.
Id. at 316 (quoting Application to Brief for Columbia University, Harvard University,
Stanford University, and the University of Pennsylvania, as Amici Curiae 2-3).
214

215
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the admission of a black student with potentially less to offer towards
diversity than a white student of unique background. A narrowly tailored program, by focusing on multi-faceted diversity, avoids this
dilemma.
At the secondary school level, the First Circuit chastised the
Boston Latin School for "focus[ing] exclusively on racial and ethnic
diversity" in its admissions. 6 Although the program asserted an interest in true diversity, it only considered whether the student fell into
one of five racial categories-black, white, Hispanic, Asian, and Native American.2 17 Such a focus invokes precisely the dangers Justice
Powell feared in Bakke. Rather than a means towards achieving true
diversity, the First Circuit saw the program as "a mechanism for racial balancing" that was not "a legitimate or necessary means of218advancing the lofty principles [of diversity] recited by the [p]olicy."
This principle, that a narrowly tailored program must encompass
traits beyond race, is manifested in several other circuit court cases.
In Hunter, the UCLA laboratory school considered race, gender, and
family income in admissions, as well as any other factors relevant to
mirroring the composition of the Los Angeles school district.2 9 The
Ninth Circuit approved the laboratory school's admissions policy as
narrowly tailored to its unique goal. In contrast, the Fourth Circuit
invalidated an interdistrict transfer program that approved or rejected
transfer requests based on the impact the request would have on racial
diversity within the schools involved. 220 This program, focused solely
on race, could not survive the court's scrutiny because it constituted
"mere racial balancing in a pure form.",22 1 Thus, attention to all aspects of diversity is as essential in the secondary school context, at
least for magnet and examination schools, as it is in higher education.
This requirement becomes more problematic at the elementary
school level. Admissions at an elementary school is a function of
geography, rather than a conscious admissions process, and the options available to a school seeking to increase diversity are limited
accordingly. At least one solution to this dilemma, however, appears
capable of surviving strict scrutiny. In 1989, the Boston School
Committee divided the city into three zones designed to "reflect the
system-wide proportion of students of different races at the K-8
216

Wessmann,160 F.3d at798.

217
218

Id.
Id. at 799.

219

Hunter ex reL Brandt v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d 1061, 1062 (9th Cir.

1999), cert.denied,531 U.S. 877 (2000).
22o Eisenberg ex rel Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir.
1999), cert. denied,529 U.S. 1019 (2000).
221 Id. at 131.
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level., 222 Students are given the option of applying to any school
within their zone.223 Admission to a student's first choice of school is
then dependent on several factors, including race.2 4 This makes the
program appear quite similar to admissions at a university or examination school, and attention to all aspects of diversity should be required. If, however, the city met this requirement, the program would
appear to be a constitutionally permissible
means of obtaining diver25
sity at the elementary school level. 2
C. Offer an Alternative
A final requirement of a narrowly tailored race-based admissions
program is that it must provide an equal, alternative educational opportunity for those students denied admission. In the context of an
interdistrict transfer denial, the Brewer court upheld the use of race in
considering transfer requests in part because those students denied
transfer were able to receive an equivalent education at another
school.226 The court distinguished the plaintiff in Brewer from that in
Bakke because, while "the plaintiff in Bakke was completely denied
his education," the student in Brewer "was only prevented from attending the school of her choice. ' 22 7 The court similarly distinguished Wessmann as "more akin to Bakke because
the plaintiff was
228
education."
alternative
equivalent
an
offered
not
The Second Circuit's approach in Brewer has firm roots in
Bakke. Judge Straub's opinion notes that the Davis Medical School
"'did not arrange for [Bakke] to attend a different medical school'
which made Bakke's situation 'wholly dissimilar' to that of an elementary or secondary school student who is admitted to one school
rather than another in an effort to promote racial or ethnic integration., 229 Due to the ubiquitous requirement among states that students
receive public schooling until a certain age, an alternative will clearly
always exist at the elementary and secondary level. The issue then is
whether the alternative is substantially equivalent. 3 ° In the rare situa222 Boston's Children First v. City of Boston, 62 F. Supp. 2d 247, 252 (D. Mass. 1999),
mandamusgranted,In re Boston's Children First, 244 F.3d 164 (1st Cir. 2001).
2z Id.

2

id.

25 The district court in Boston's Children First did not discuss whether the program ad-

dressed all aspects of diversity. Nonetheless, the details of the city's program provide an excellent example of a situation where attention to "true" diversity would be relevant and required at
the elementary school level.
226 Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Cent. Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738, 751 (2d Cir. 2000).
227 Id.
m Id. at 752.
229 Id. at 751 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 300 n.39

(1978)).
230

Id.
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tion where it is not, as when a student is denied admission to a prestigious magnet or examination school, the school district should strive
to ensure that the student rejected is able to attend a school that offers
substantially similar programs. 231
CONCLUSION

Clearly, diversity is an elusive, underrated, yet essential component of an effective and complete education. Every person carries
with them experiences and traits, both immutable and fluid, which
contribute to their own unique personality. These may include a person's religion, social class, or gender. They may include that person's race. What courts need to recognize, as educators already have,
is that these traits do more than simply define an individual student's
personality. They also contribute tremendously to the social growth
and intellectual development of those who work and learn beside that
student on a daily basis. Because this growth and development is
maximized when diversity is at its highest, attention to various aspects of diversity, including race, is often necessary.
Despite the correlation between diversity and student achievement, the viability of the diversity justification in education is by no
means secure. Supreme Court affirmative action jurisprudence has
limited the use of race-based classifications in the economic sector
and called into question whether diversity survives in education.
However, in the midst of this web of precedent, a path remains for
diversity to tread. It is this path that the Supreme Court should follow, embracing diversity in education along the way, and allowing
students of every race to achieve things together that they could not
surrounded only by those like themselves.
JEFFREY D. GROSSET14

For example, while other schools may not be able to match the tremendous prestige of
the Boston Latin School, the local school district should at least attempt to provide students
unable to attend Boston Latin with the same classes, extracurricular activities, advanced placement opportunities, and other similar programs.
* I would like to thank Professor Jonathan L. Entin for his assistance, the staff of the
Case Western Reserve Law Review for their support, and my wife, Melissa, for her patience and
sacrifice throughout the writing of this Note.
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